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CONDITIONS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
MERTON FERSON*
EXPRESS AND IMPLIED CONDITIONS
Conditions Precedent. Assume that a contract obligation has been
created. When must the obligor perform? In some cases the per-
formances become due by the mere passing of time. But in many
cases the performances are not due until and unless certain other
events have occurred. These other events are called conditions prece-
dent. Until they come to pass the obligor may omit performance with
impunity. He has an excuse that will stay the hand of the obligee.
The case of Shadforth v. Higgin' will serve to illustrate the immunity
of an obligor when a condition precedent has not come to pass. In
that case Shadforth had promised to send, and did send, a ship from
England to pick up a cargo in Jamaica. The defendant, Higgin, had
promised to provide a cargo, and pay freight on it, on condition that
the ship should arrive in Jamaica and be ready to load by the 25th
of June. It turned out that the ship did not arrive in Jamaica until
July 3d. There was thus a failure to satisfy the express condition
precedent-viz, that the ship should arrive and be ready to load by
June 25th. The result was that Higgin was excused permanently from
his obligation to provide a cargo.
The Term "Conditional Obligation." The idea of an obligor who
need not perform is a paradox. A common explanation is that the
obligation is conditional. But this explanation falls short of clearing
up the paradox. The existence of the obligation is not at all condi-
tional. The obliger, by our assumption, is firmly bound. The right of
the obligee is vested. He has a thing. It can be bought, sold, taxed
and inherited. The term "conditional obligation" is, at best, an ellip-
tical, i.e., an incomplete description of a situation and calls for a more
extended statement.
A condition precedent comes into play when the obliger is bound,
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Dean Emeritus, University of
Cincinnati College of Law; author, The Rational Basis of Contracts (1949),
Principles of Agency (1954).
1. 3 Camp. 385, 170 Eng. Rep. 1419 (N.P. 1813).
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but, by express provision or otherwise, he has an excuse that will stay
the hand of his obligee even if the obligor does not perform. The con-
dition precedent (fact or event), if it occurs, puts an end to the excuse.
In Shadforth v. Higgin2 for instance, the merchant, defendant, had an
excuse. He was bound, but he could with impunity omit to furnish
a cargo unless the plaintiff, shipowner, brought his ship and made it
ready for loading by June 25th. If that event had occurred it would
have put an end to the defendant's excuse. A condition in the sense
of fact or event does not protect the obligor. It is the excuse, ex-
pressed or implicit in the situation, that protects him. The condition
(fact or event), when it occurs, takes away his protection. When
all the conditions precedent have occurred, the obligor is exposed
to an action if he does not immediately perform. It is the right of ac-
tion, not the basic right, that is conditional.
Condition Precedent: Another Sense of the Term. The term "condi-
tion precedent" is sometimes used to mean a fact or event that must
exist or occur in order to create a contract obligation. To be specific,
there must be capable parties, mutual assent, suitable form, considera-
tion and lawful subject matter. All these factors are conditions pre-
cedent to the very existence of a contract obligation. Such use of the
term "condition precedent" is accurate enough. But, according to more
general usage, the term means a fact that exists or shall occur after a
contract obligation has been made, in order to create a duty of
immediate performance.3
The word "condition" is used in still another sense. Sometimes it
means what is herein being called the "excuse" of the obligor. In
that sense it is a concept, i.e., a mental device. And a condition prece-
dent in that sense is a mental summation of facts whereby an obligor
is protected from suit. The use of the word "condition" as meaning
the concept "excuse" appears in the following sentences: "Breach
of promise subjects the promisor to liability in damages, but does not
necessarily excuse performance on the other side. Breach or non-
occurrence of a condition prevents the promisee from acquiring a right,
or deprives him of one, but subjects him to no liability."4
This double and triple sense in which the word "condition" is used
may be confusing at times. But the context generally makes it clear
which meaning is intended.
Express Conditions. Recall the case of Shadforth v. Higgin.5 The de-
fendant promised to provide a cargo for the plaintiff's ship at Jamaica
"provided she arrives out and ready by the 25th of June." The agree-
ment of the parties, expressed in words, was that the defendant
2. Ibid.
3. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 250, and comment a (1932).
4. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 665 (rev. ed. 1936).
5. 3 Camp. 385, 170 Eng. Rep. 1419 (N.P. 1813).
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should have a duty. It was likewise agreed, and stated in words, that
the defendant should not come under an immediate duty to perform
unless the ship should "arrive out and ready by the 25th of June."
That event was an express condition. Pending that event, the plaintiff
had a right and the defendant had an excuse.
One coherent bit of writing or speaking may include a promise and
a condition. This coherence of language should not be allowed to
obscure the fact that two ideas are expressed. One idea is that the
promisor undertakes to do something. The other idea is that the
promisor shall have an excuse that will shield him until a specified
event shall occur. Suppose A, for a consideration, signs the following
memorandum: "I promise to pay B five dollars, on condition that B
shall saw my pile of wood." The second clause is not a promise. It
does not create or add to any obligation. It does not commit anyone
to do anything. It is rather a statement which operates to reserve an
excuse to the obligor. The same idea could be expressed in two
sentences, one promissory and the other declarative, like this: "I
promise to pay B five dollars" (promise); "I shall not be amerced
so long as B has not sawed my wood" (excuse). This last sentence
is not a promise. And it does not add to nor subtract from the promise.
It affects only the right of action. So long as B does not saw the
wood, A has an excuse to which courts will give effect by denying
a right of action against A. The right of B exists. He may sell and
assign it, but he has no right of action.
Implied Conditions Precedent. Just as promises (undertakings)
are sometimes express and sometimes implied, so are excuses some-
times express and sometimes implied. In Thurnell v. Balbirnie6 it
appeared that the defendant had contracted to buy a stock of goods
at a valuation to be made by a Mr. Matthews and another. Mr.
Matthews refused to act in the matter. The participation of Mr.
Matthews was taken to be an implied condition precedent to the
liability of the defendant. The plaintiff, failing to satisfy that con-
dition, was unable to recover. In Morton v. Lamb7 it appeared that
the defendant had agreed to sell and deliver a quantity of corn to
the plaintiff at Shardlow. The corn was not delivered and the plain-
tiff sued, alleging default on the part of the defendant. But the plain-
tiff omitted to allege the satisfaction of an implied condition precedent
-viz. that the plaintiff was ready to pay for the corn.
Shaw, C. J. gives this illustration: "Suppose B agrees to build, at
his own shop, a carriage for A, of A's materials; A stipulates seasonably
to furnish materials, and to pay B in four months.... The furnishing
or tendering the materials by A is a condition precedent.
'8
6. 2 M. & W. 786, 150 Eng. Rep. 975 (Ex. 1837).
7. 7 T.R. 125, 101 Eng. Rep. 890 (K.B. 1797).
8. Cadwell v. Blake, 6 Gray 402, 409 (Mass. 1856).
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When a bilateral contract calls for an extended performance by
one of the parties and the performance. of the other party can be
rendered in a moment, the extended performance is usually a condi-
tion precedent to the other party's duty of immediate performance.9
This proposition is applied in service contracts like this: "A promises
to work for B for six months, and B promises to pay him $100.00 a
month. The salary for any one month is not due until the work for
that month has been done." 10
Express Promises: Express Conditions: Problem of Interpretation.
When a contract makes reference to an act that one of the parties
should do, it is sometimes a nice question whether the party that
should do the act, (a) has promised (undertaken) to do the act,
or (b) has agreed that its own right of action is conditional on the act
being done. In Southern Surety Co. v. MacMillan Co." for instance,
the surety company had given a bond to assure the performance of
a contract between the MacMillan Company and the Oklahoma Book
Company. The bond provided "That in the event of any default on
the part of the Principal, written notice . . . shall within sixty days
after such default be mailed to the Surety." The Oklahoma Company
(principal) was tardy in making reports and remittances from time to
time, but the MacMillan Company gave no notice of such de-
linquencies for a year or more after they occurred. The MacMillan
Company sued on the bond. The court therefore had to deal with
the "difficult question, Is this Agreement as to notice a condition
precedent to liability, or is it a concurrent promise, for breach of
which plaintiff is liable for such damage as may flow from the breach?"
It was held by a divided court that the provision with regard to notice
stated a promise by the MacMillan Company to give the notice,
but not a condition precedent to its own right of action on the bond.
The Surety Company was held liable.
It would be hard to demonstrate that the interpretation put upon
the notice clause in the MacMillan case was right or wrong. The
lesson to be learned from the case is this: Since the legal effect of a
promise and of a condition precedent are so markedly different, a
draftsman should make it clear whether a clause he inserts states
a promise or a condition precedent. As said by Professor Williston,
"When a contract reads 'it is agreed,' or 'it is provided,' or 'it is
stipulated,' or 'it is understood,' that A shall do a certain act, or simply
that the act shall be done, it is not perfectly clear whether A promises
to do the act in question, or whether he will acquire a right against
9. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 270 (1932); Stewart v. Newbury, 220 N.Y. 379,
115 N. E. 984 (1917).
10. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 270, illustration 2 (1932).
11. 58 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1932); cf. Franklin State Bank v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 256 Fed. 356 (5th Cir. 1919).
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the other party only by doing that act."' 2 Suppose, for example, a
contract whereby A promises to pay B ten dollars, and B promises
to saw A's wood. Suppose further that the contract contains this
provision: "A is to furnish the saw." Does that mean that A promises
to furnish the saw? Or does it mean that B promises to saw the wood
on condition that A furnishes the saw?
Variety of Conditions Precedent. Conditions precedent are of in-
finite variety. The most common kind are acts to be performed by
the promisee. For example, A obligates himself to pay B on condition
that B shall saw A's wood. Such a condition induces B to render the
desired performance.
In rare cases, the condition is an act to be done by the promisor. In
Reinert v. Lawson,13 for instance, Lawson contracted to buy a gin
mill from the plaintiff on condition that he (Lawson) should close a
deal he had theretofore made, to buy a farm. Lawson did not buy
the farm, owing to his own default. Since the buying of the farm
was a condition precedent, Lawson did not have to buy the gin mill.
In Work v. Beach14 it appeared that the defendant had undertaken
to pay $14,570.00 "When I shall be able to do so." Three years later
suit was brought against him. It was shown that he had been re-
ceiving an annual salary of $15,000.00, a large salary at that period
(about 1890). But the plaintiff did not prove the defendant's ability
to pay the debt. Such proof was essential to the plaintiff's right, so
he failed to recover and, said the court, "It is useless to speculate
as to what the defendant could or should have done."
The condition may also be an event that is not within the control of
either party to the contract. Familiar examples are the promises of
insurers to pay the insured on condition that his ship shall be lost
or his house shall burn.
There may be any degree of probability that the condition will or
will not occur. A promise to pay in thirty days is essentially a prom-
ise to pay on condition that thirty days shall elapse, i.e., that the earth
shall rotate thirty times. It is impossible to imagine that this condition
will not come to pass. But, as in the case of other conditions precedent,
the obligee gets no right of action until it does occur.
Satisfaction as a Condition Precedent. The satisfaction of a de-
'fendant, or the dissatisfaction of a plaintiff, with a performance of
the other party is sometimes a condition precedent. In Van Demark v.
California Home Extension Association15 it appeared that a seller of
land undertook to buy it back if "the buyer should be dissatisfied with
the investment." The buyer, alleging that he was dissatisfied with the
12. 3 WLLISTox, CONTRACTS § 665 (rev. ed. 1936).
13. 113 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
14. 59 Hun. 625, 13 N.Y. Supp. 678 (1891); see also Smith v. Hargett, 171
Kan. 679, 237 P.2d 391 (1951).
15. 43 Cal. App. 685, 185 Pac. 866 (1919).
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investment, sued to get his money back. His own dissatisfaction was
clearly a condition precedent. But his own allegation of dissatisfaction
was deemed sufficient to meet the condition. He did not have to give
his reasons. "The purpose of the agreement," said the court, "was
to submit the matter to the personal option and judgment of the
purchaser."
A more common condition precedent is that the obligor shall be
satisfied with an article sold or job done by the plaintiff. It is some-
times difficult to make out whether the defendant is satisfied or not.
The fact of satisfaction, or lack of it, is within the defendant's mind.
It is not exposed to the view of others. The defendant's own word
may be the only evidence available. That is always so where satis-
faction has to do with the artistic effect of a job. But where the de-
fendant's satisfaction has to do with the utility of a job, there may be
objective facts that discredit the defendant's word.
Suppose A is to saw a pile of wood into sticks one foot long. And B
is to pay A on condition that he is satisfied with the job. Suppose
further that A saws the wood perfectly, according to his contract,
but B says he is not satisfied. Now there are conflicting indicia as
to whether B is satisfied. On one hand B says, "I am not satisfied."
On the other hand the wood is perfectly sawed and B has an interest in
representing that he is not satisfied. The objective facts may have
enough probative force to overcome B's statement. In Hawkins v.
Graham,16 for instance, the plaintiff had agreed to set up a heating
apparatus in the defendant's building that would heat the building to
seventy degrees in the coldest weather. The defendant promised to
pay for the job if he were satisfied. The heating apparatus was in-
stalled, but the defendant said he was not satisfied with it. How was
the fact of defendant's satisfaction to be determined? Holmes, J.,
said that the defendant's declaration was not conclusive and that the
fact was "to be determined by the mind of a reasonable man, and by
the external measures set forth in the contract."
Employment contracts sometimes provide that an employee shall
be retained so long as his services are satisfactory to the employer.
In this type of case there may or may not be evidence, external to
the employer's mind, as to whether he is honestly dissatisfied. It de-
pends on what the employee is to do. In Crawford v. Mail and Express
Publishing Co.17 the employee was to write articles for a newspaper
and to be retained so long as his services "shall be satisfactory to
the publishers." The publishers had a right to discharge the plaintiff
at any time they might elect. "It was their taste, their fancy, their
interest and their judgment that was to be satisfied." But in Stevens
16. 149 Mass. 284, 21 N.E. 312 (1889). See also Winkelman Co. v. Barr,
178 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1949).
17. 163 N.Y. 404 (1900).
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v. Rugo & Sons, Inc.'s where the plaintiff had been hired as an es-
timator for so long as his services were satisfactory, a different result
was reached. It was held to be a question for the jury as to whether
the employer had reasonable cause for dissatisfaction.
Approval by or Satisfaction of a Third Party as a Condition. The
approval or satisfaction of a third party is frequently made a condition
precedent. A promise to buy land, for instance, may be made on the
condition that a certain lawyer shall approve the title. A more com-
mon provision is that an employer shall pay for a building operation
on condition that a certain architect shall certify that the job has
been done according to specifications. The purpose of requiring an
architect's certificate is obvious. The promisor wants to make sure
that he will get what he pays for. And the architect's certificate is
a means to that end.
In a good many cases builders have been allowed to recover without
furnishing the architect's certificates. It is uniformly held that a
builder can so recover if the architect dies, or colludes with the owner,
or fails to examine the work or fails to exercise an honest judgment.19
But suppose an architect is honestly dissatisfied with a piece of work,
and yet the judge or jury believes the work was properly done. There
is a difference of opinion among the courts when that situation arises.
In Nolan v. Whitney,20 for instance, the plaintiff had undertaken
to do mason work for $11,700.00. He was to do the work to the
satisfaction of an architect and was to obtain a certificate from the
architect before any payment could be required to be made. The
plaintiff failed to obtain the architect's certificate. But the referee
found that the plaintiff had done the vork according to the terms
of the agreement. It seems to have been conceded by the referee
that there were "trivial defects" for which a deduction of $200.00
should be made. The plaintiff was allowed to recover.
The weight of authority is probably against the decision in Nolan
v. Whitney.21 The decision in that case takes away from the employer
the benefit of an important condition that was set up in the contract.
Whether a building operation has been done well and according to
specifications is often a complicated question of fact, and calls for
determination by an expert. When an owner has fortified himself
by providing for the determination of that question by an expert, the
owner's case should not lightly be submitted to the opinion of an
inexpert judge or jury.
18. 209 F.2d 135 (1st Cir. 1953).
19. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 303 (1932).
20. 88 N.Y. 648 (1882). Contra (on similar facts), Ashley v. Henahan,
56 Ohio St. 559, 47 N.E. 573 (1897).
21. Hebert v. Dewey, 191 Mass. 403, 77 N.E. 822 (1906); T. F. Callahan,
Inc. v. Commissioners, 102 N.J.L. 705, 133 Atl. 408 (Ct. Err. & App. 1926);
Ashley v. Henahan, 56 Ohio St. 559, 47 N.E. 573 (1897).
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Conditions Subsequent: Property. Conditions subsequent are com-
mon enough in the law of property. But they are extremely rare in
the law of contracts. The phrase has a significance in the law of
property that is different from its significance in the law of contracts.
By way of illustrating the meaning and effect of a condition subse-
quent in the law of property, note the case of Hale v. Finch.22 In
that case it appeared that Hale had sold a steamboat to Finch. In
the bill of sale there was this recital: "And it is understood and
agreed that this sale is upon this express condition, that said steam-
boat or vessel is not ... to be run upon" certain specified waters. That
provision was a condition subsequent. Said Justice Harlan in the
course of his opinion, "The vendee took the property subject to the
right which the law reserved to the vendor, of recovering it upon
breach of the condition specified. The vendee was willing, as the words
in their natural and ordinary sense indicate, to risk the loss of the
steamboat when such breach occurred." Speaking generally, a
condition subsequent in the law of property means some event that
may occur subsequent to the owner's acquisition of title and operate
to terminate the title or give the grantor a power of termination.
Condition Subsequent: In Contracts. Let us next attend to the
meanings of "condition precedent" and "condition subsequent" in
the law of contracts. The noun "condition" means some fact or event
that may come to pass. The adjectives "precedent" and "subsequent"
imply a point of reckoning. A condition is precedent or subsequent
relative to what? They are dated with reference to the accrual of
a cause of action. And it should be observed that the definition of
these two kinds of conditions is more than pedantic. There is a
substantial difference in the operation of the one and the other. A
condition precedent is a fact or event that must occur before there
can be a cause of action.23 For example, a party who contracted to
furnish a cargo on condition that the plaintiff's boat should arrive in
Jamaica by a certain date was not subject to a right of action unless
the boat arrived by that time. In contrast, a condition subsequent
is an event that operates to take away a right of action that has
accrued. For example, an insurance policy provided that no suit
should be brought on the policy more than twelve months after the
loss. 24 The normal operation of such a condition would be this: The
plaintiff would have a right of action after making proof of his loss.
But that right of action would be taken away by the lapse of twelve
months following a loss. Another illustration of a condition subsequent
would be found in a case where there came, first a cause of action,
followed by a failure of consideration. The following illustration
22. 104 U.S. 261 (1881).
23. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 250 (1932).
24. Semmes v. Hartford Ins. Co., 13 Wall. 158 (U.S. 1871).
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is taken from the Restatement: "A contracts to sell and B to buy
a specific horse on July 1, 1927. B contracts to pay the price on
June 15. B fails to pay as he promised and A acquires a right of ac-
tion. Before July I the horse dies. A no longer has a right of action."
' '
Condition Precedent: Subsequent in Form. An express condition
may be subsequent in form when it is really a condition precedent.
In Clark Co. v. Banner Packing Co.,26 for instance, there was an under-
taking to sell canned corn. And then came this provision: "In case
of the destruction of the Canning Factory, seller is not liable for non-
delivery." That sounds like a condition subsequent. But, look again!
It will be seen that no right of action shall accrue if the factory
burns. In other words, the continued existence of the factory is a con-
dition precedent.
The distinction between conditions precedent and conditions sub-
sequent has practical importance in the matter of procedure. Since
a plaintiff must make out his cause of action, it follows that he has
the burden of pleading and proving conditions precedent. But when
he has established his cause of action, the defendant has the burden
of pleading any fact (condition) that he relies on to take away the
cause of action that existed against him. This general rule with regard
to the burden of proof must in some instances give way to considera-
tions of justice and convenience. An insurance policy, for instance,
is so studded with conditions precedent that it would be tedious and
difficult for an insured to prove all of them. He is, therefore, required
in many jurisdictions to prove only the ones that the insurance com-
pany sets up against him.
2 7
CONSTRUCTIVE CONDITIONS
Basis of Constructive Conditions. Express conditions and implied
conditions are set up by the parties to the contract. Express conditions
are found in the words of the agreement. Implied conditions are found
when the parties have somehow, other than by words, indicated that
the conditions exist. An express condition and an implied condition
are alike, except that one is proved by words, and the other by
acts from which the condition can be inferred.
Constructive conditions are not set up by the parties to a contract.
They are set up by the courts in the interest of justice. There may, in
some instances, be an overlapping. That is, a condition may exist for
two reasons-viz, the parties apparently intended to set it up, and
the court would have set it up anyway. We are dealing, at the
25. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 277, illustration 1 (1932), see also Beecher v.
Conradt, 13 N.Y. 108 (1855), 64 Am. Dec. 535 (1911).
26. 12 Ohio App. 87, 31 Ohio C.C. (N.s.) 285 (1919); see also Gray v.
Gardner, 17 Mass. (16 Tyng) 188 (1821); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 259
(1932).
27. RIcHARDs, INsuRANcE § 366 (5th ed. 1952).
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moment, with conditions that are set up by the courts, regardless of
whether the parties provided or intimated that such a condition should
exist.
Concurrent Conditions It is common parlance to say that parties
make "a contract," as though they make a single thing. We even
speak of a bilateral contract as though it were a single thing. But
it makes for accuracy to remember that bilateral contract is two
things. When A and B make a bilateral contract: A undertakes, and
thus creates, an obligation that rests on him; B undertakes, and thus
creates, an obligation that rests on him. Each party is an obligor as
to one of the obligations and an obligee as to the other. It is no
cause for wonder that, when bilateral contracts came to be enforce-
able, courts took the view that each obligation was independent of
the other. And so, in the absence of any condition inserted by the
parties, each obligation was enforced as it would be if it were a
unilateral contract. For example, it appeared in Nichols v. Rayn-
bred, 2 that the plaintiff had promised to deliver a cow to the de-
fendant and the defendant had promised to pay fifty shillings to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff was allowed to recover the fifty shillings al-
though he did not aver delivery of the cow. That is, the seller could
sue for the price. The buyer could sue for non-delivery of the cow.
That was logical and complete redress according to the terms of the
two obligations.
The unfairness of subjecting a defendant to judgment in favor of
a plaintiff who had not performed, or tendered performance of his
own obligation impressed the courts, and constructive conditions came
to be set up in the interest of justice. Although a bilateral contract
consists of two obligations, its overall aspect is usually a bargain to
exchange performances. That is especially obvious when the two per-
formances are to be rendered at the same time. The courts finally
took account of this exchange idea. They held that a plaintiff, suing
on such a contract, was subject to a concurrent condition-viz., he must
show that he, at least, tendered his own performance.
In contrast with the case of Nichols v. Raynbred decided in 1615,
wherein a seller was allowed to recover the price of a cow without de-
livering the cow, we note the case of Goodisson v. Nunn,29 decided in
1792. In this case the plaintiff had engaged to sell land to the de-
fendant, and the defendant had undertaken to pay to the plaintiff Z210.
The plaintiff sued for the price without tendering the land. He
was not allowed to recover. Said Lord Kenyon, C. J., "The old cases,
cited by the plaintiff's counsel, have been accurately stated; but the
28. Hobart 88, 80 Eng. Rep. 238 (K.B. 1615).
29. 4 Term R. 761, 100 Eng. Rep. 1289 (K.B. 1792). See also First Nat.
Bank in Salem v. Morgan, 132 Ore. 515, 284 Pac. 582, rehearing denied, 132
Ore. 515, 286 Pac. 558 (1930).
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determinations in them outrage common sense. . . . I am glad to
find that the old cases have been overruled, and that we are now
warranted by precedent as well as by principle to say that this action
cannot be maintained."
It will be observed that concurrent conditions cannot be deemed
to exist in all bilateral contracts. They are not appropriate unless the
promises can be simultaneously performed and the parties can be
assured that they are being so performed. We shall, in later sections,
deal with the question of constructive conditions in bilateral con-
tracts where one, or both, of the performances called for will con-
sume an extended period of time. We shall also consider cases where
performances rendered are more or less complete. Concurrent con-
ditions that can be performed in an instant and that are completely
performed, or not performed at all, are relatively simple. They, how-
ever, illustrate the basic idea of "agreed exchange" and serve as an
introduction to problems that arise with regard to constructive condi-
tions that are not concurrent.
Conditions Where Performance of One Promise Extends over a
Period of Time and the Other Does Not. A bilateral contract
that calls for a performance on one side that can be rendered in a
moment, and for a performance on the other side that will consume
time, may still be a contract for an agreed exchange. But the per-
formances cannot be concurrent conditions. They cannot be simultane-
ous. One party must perform and trust the other to render the counter
performance. In a service contract, for instance, there cannot be a
simultaneous payment of wages and rendition of service. Must the
worker perform and trust the employer? Or must the employer pay
the wages and trust the worker? The question came up in Coletti v.
Knox Hat Co.-3 The plaintiff had promised to render services to
the defendant as sales agent for a year, and, at the end of the year,
the defendant was to pay commissions to the plaintiff. The plaintiff,
having served only eight months of the year, sought to recover com-
missions. It was held that the plaintiff could not recover commissions,
because performance by him through the entire year was a condition
precedent to his right of action. Said Kellogg, J., "When the per-
formance of a contract consists in doing (faciendo) on one side, and
in giving (dando) on the other side, the doing must take place before
the giving." "The law will never presume" said Professor Langdell
3 l
"that a thing is to be paid for before it is done." A more general state-
ment of the rule appears in the Restatement of Contracts.
32 It is to
the effect that where performance on one side will extend over a
30. 242 N.Y. 468, 169 N.E. 648 (1930). See also Stewart v. Newbury, 220
N.Y. 379, 115 N.E. 984 (1917).
31. LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 125 (1880).
32. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 270 (1932).
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period of time and the other will not, the former is a condition
precedent to the latter.
Substantial Performance. When one party to a contract for an
agreed exchange fails altogether to perform his duty under the bar-
gain, he is precluded from recovery against his co-contractor. He is
blocked by a constructive condition set up by the courts for the sake
of justice. But a plaintiff's failure to perform may be more or less
complete. And there may be extenuating circumstances. In case the
shortage in the plaintiff's performance is small and has occurred in
spite of his care and diligence, denial to him of his right of action
would be unjust. And, says Judge Cardozo, "There will be no as-
sumption of a purpose to visit venial faults with oppressive retribu-
tion."33 In the next paragraph of his opinion Judge Cardozo goes on
to say, "Where the line is to be drawn between the important and the
trivial [shortage] cannot be settled by a formula. 'In the nature of
the case precise boundaries are impossible.' Williston on Contracts,
841. The same omission may take on one aspect or another according
to its setting."
Since a plaintiff's performance may have been rhore or less com-
plete, his reasons for a shortage may be more or less meritorious and
the shortage may be more or less injurious to the defendant, the
constructive condition that a plaintiff must satisfy is summed up like
this: He must have substantially performed. The criteria that make
out substantial performance, or lack of it, are admirably set forth in
the Restatement of Contracts.34
"Substantial Performance" generally means something less than full
and exact performance. A party who falls short, much or little, of
rendering complete performance of his contractual duty is liable to a
suit for damages. The question we are pursuing at the moment, how-
ever, is whether and how much one party can fail to perform his own
undertaking and still recover from his co-contractor.
Substantial Performance: Illustrations. "Substantial performance"
says Pound, J., "is a term of law which conveys little, if any, meaning
to the lay mind and ordinarily sends the lawyer to his digests to dis-
cover the most recent illustrations of its judicial use. '35 Even the
illustrations leave the lawyer in a quandary, because the facts of the
cases where the term is used are so varied. Here are a few cases where
it was held that the plaintiff did not substantially perform: In a
California case36 the plaintiff had contracted to erect a building for
$3,565 on certain land. It was not deemed substantial performance
when he erected it partly upon an adjoining street and the cost of
33. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921).
34. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 275 (1932).
35. Steel Storage and Elevator Const. Co. v. Stock, 225 N.Y. 173, 121 N.E.
786, 787 (1919).
36. Herdal v. Sheehy, 163 Cal. 163, 159 Pac. 422 (1916).
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correcting the fault would exceed $660.00. In a New York case37 the
plaintiff had contracted to construct an elevator with a capacity of
4,000 bushels per hour. It was not a substantial performance when
the plaintiff constructed an elevator with a capacity of only 3300
bushels per hour. In a Wisconsin case- a boxer sued to recover the
price of his professional services. He had contracted to box ten rounds
under certain rules. In the second round he struck a foul blow, in
violation of one of the rules and disabled his opponent. "[He] thus,"
said the court, "by his own act made substantial performance im-
possible."
On the other hand, here are a few cases where defective perform-
ances were deemed substantial performances: In a California case3 9
the plaintiff bargained to do a plumbing and heating job for $27,332.00.
The cost of the entire building was $186,000.00. The plaintiff's per-
formance was defective to the extent that it reduced the value of
the building by $2,180.00. It still amounted to substantial performance.
A Washington case40 was an action for the price of cardboard cartons.
It appeared that two words in small print, descriptive of the product
contained in each carton, were spelled incorrectly. Still the perform-
ance was deemed substantial. In a United States Court of Appeals
case4 ' action had been brought on a surety bond. The plaintiff, as-
sured, had promised to give prompt notice in the event of any default
on the part of the principal debtor. There were defaults by the prin-
cipal debtor from time to time and the plaintiff omitted for more than
a year to give notice thereof. Still the plaintiff was able to recover.
The case of Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent' 2 is important by reason
of what it holds, and by reason of Judge Cardozo's illuminating opin-
ion. The facts were that the plaintiff had undertaken to build a
country residence for the defendant at a cost of $77,000. One of the
specifications called for the installation of "'Standard Pipe' of Reading
Manufacture." Owing to the inadvertence of a sub-contractor, Cohoes
pipe, instead of Reading, was installed. When the defendant dis-
covered that the wrong kind of pipe had been used, his architect di-
rected the plaintiff to do the work anew. But at this juncture the pipe
had been encased in the walls of the building. In order to put in
Reading pipe, it would have been necessary to demolish substantial
parts of the completed structure, at enormous expense. The plaintiff
left the work as it was. The architect refused to give him a certificate
37. Steel Storage & Elevator Const. Co. v. Stock, 225 N.Y. 173, 121 N.E.
786 (1919).
38. Moha v. Hudson Boxing Club, 164 Wis. 425, 160 N.W. 266 (1916). See
also Jerome v. Queen City Cycle Co., 163 N.Y. 351, 57 N.E. 485 (1900).
39. Thomas Haverty Co. v. Jones, 185 Cal. 285, 197 Pac. 105 (1921).
40. Discount Corp. of Washington v. Philippine MIfg. Co. of America, 150
Wash. 274, 272 Pac. 970 (1928).
41. Southern Surety Co. v. MacNlillan, 58 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1932).
42. 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921).
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that the final payment was due. The plaintiff sued for $3,483.00, the
unpaid balance of the cost price. He tried to show at the trial that
the Cohoes pipe, installed by mistake, was the same in quality, appear-
ance, market value and cost as Reading pipe. After diverse rulings had
been made in the lower courts the court of appeals held that the plain-
tiff should have judgment.
It was clear that the plaintiff's performance fell short of compliance
with his contract. But how should the extent of his shortage be com-
puted? Should it be computed according to what it would cost the
defendant to install Reading pipe and so make the finished job con-
form to the contract? Or should it be computed according to the
difference in value of the house, equipped as it was with Cohoes pipe,
and, what it's value would be if equipped with Reading pipe? The
shortage would be enormous if appraised by the former standard and
trivial if appraised by the latter standard. The court decided that
"In the circumstances of this case, we think the measure of the
allowance is not the cost of replacement, which would be great, but
the difference in value, which would be either nominal or nothing."43
Other courts have used the same method of computing shortages.44
Judge Cardozo's opinion, however, is notable for its exposition of
substantial performance as a condition precedent. The difference in
value between a piece of work as it has been done, and the value it
would have if it had been done according to contract is not always
the measure of a plaintiff's shortage. Judge Cardozo is careful to
point out that: "The same omission may take on one aspect or an-
other according to its setting. Substitution of equivalents may not
have the same significance in fields of art on the one side and in those
of mere utility on the other. Nowhere will change be tolerated, how-
ever, if it is so dominant or pervasive as in any real or substantial
measure to frustrate the purpose of the contract."45
Another limitation on what is held in the Jacob & Youngs case is
stated by Judge Cardozo as follows: "This is not to say that the parties
are not free by apt and certain words to effectuate a purpose that per-
formance of every term shall be a condition of recovery. That question
is not here. This is merely to say that the law will be slow to impute
the purpose, in the silence of the parties, where the significance of
the default is grievously out of proportion to the oppression of the
forfeiture. '46
Belated Performance. Delay in performance is not a perfect per-
formance. It may, however, be a substantial performance, depending
43. Id. at 891.
44. Thomas Haverty Co. v. Jones, 185 Cal. 285, 197 Pac. 105 (1921); Dis-
count Corp. of Washington v. Philippine Mfg. Co., 150 Wash., 274, 272 Pac.
970 (1928).




on the length of the delay and the circumstances. It is commonly
said that performance at the time set by the contract is more important
in cases of mercantile contracts than it is in cases that have to do
with the sale or purchase of land.47 It seems to be a matter of rela-
tive importance in either case. In Helgar Corporation v. Warner's Fea-
tures, Inc.,48 it appeared that a buyer of films who omitted to pay for
an installment of films for two days after payment was due had not
yet materially failed. On the other hand, time may be deemed to be
of the essence in a real estate contract if the seller knows that the
buyer needs to get the property promptly.
49
Obligor Ignorant of His Excuse. Let us draw an analogy: It is
elementary that a person can be vested with a contract or property
right although he does not know that he has it. For example, a third
party in whose favor the bargaining parties have made a contract may
have a right without knowing it. And a grantee or devisee of property
may own the property without knowing that he owns it. Now to in-
troduce an analogous situation: Suppose that a contractor has an ex-
cuse for not performing what he promised to do, but is unaware of
having such excuse. To illustrate the problem, suppose that a master,
being unaware that he has grounds for doing so, discharges his servant.
And suppose further that, unbeknown to the master, the servant has
been guilty of drunkenness or other misconduct that would justify his
discharge. In such a case the master is not liable.50 And it can be
taken as a general rule that, when an excuse for not performing has
accrued to an obligor, it is valid, whether or not the obligor knows
that he has such excuse.
Lack of Consideration: Failure of Consideration. In the discussion
of bilateral contracts, the phrases "lack of consideration" and "failure
of consideration" have meanings that are distinctly different. The
term "lack of consideration" is pertinent to the making of a contract.
It is elementary that such a lack negates the very existence of a
contract. But the assumption of an obligation by one party can
be consideration for the obligation assumed by another party. When,
therefore, the parties to a bilateral contract have assumed their re-
spective obligations, there is no "lack of consideration." Both parties
are bound.
The phrase "failure of consideration" comes into play at a later
stage in the dealings of the parties-viz., when one party is being
sued for his alleged default. It has a technical meaning that is not
literally expressed by the words. When a plaintiff is blocked from
47. RESTATEMENT, 'CONTRACTS § 276 (1932).
48. 222 N.Y. 449, 119 N.E. 113 (1918). See also Benedict v. Harris, 158 Ore.
613, 77 P.2d 442 (1938).
49. Browning v. Huff, 204 Ky. 13, 263 S.W. 661 (1924); Hermanson v. Slatter,
176 Wis. 426, 187 N.W. 177 (1922).
50. Green v. Edgar, 21 Hun. 414 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1880).
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recovery owing to a "failure of consideration," it does not mean
that the consideration, i.e. the obligation, has failed. It means that
the plaintiff has failed. He has not rendered a performance according
to his undertaking.
Failure of Consideration: Secondary Effect. Let us suppose that A
and B have made a bilateral contract. That is, each has assumed
an obligation in exchange for an obligation assumed by the other.
In that situation, it is the law that A must substantially perform ac-
cording to his obligation in order to hold B. Such performance is a
condition precedent. And a prospective failure on the part of A will
preclude him from recovering. The absence of such a prospect is
a condition precedent. So long as A fails, or seems likely to fail
materially, in the rendering of his performance, B is under no duty
immediately to perform.
Now turn the tables. A's omission to perform may constitute a
breach of his duty,51 as well as a failure of consideration. If that is so,
B will desire to recover against A. Must B substantially perform
what he was to do as a condition precedent to his right of action
against A? The answer is: No. B has been excused from performing.
In other words, B is not under an immediate duty to perform. Since
he is not under such a duty there would be no justice in setting up per-
formance by him as a condition that he must meet in order to hold A.
Divisible Contracts: Defined.
The doctrine of implied dependency in contracts for agreed exchange
gets to be complicated as it is applied to "divisible contracts." The first
difficulty lies in defining "divisible contract." And the second difficulty
lies in figuring out according to the decision what difference it makes
whether or not a contract is divisible.
The definition of a divisible contract, according to the Restatement,
is this: "[A] contract is divisible where by its terms, 1, performance
of each party is divided into two or more parts, and, 2, the number of
parts due from each party is the same, and, 3, the performance of each
part by one party is the agreed exchange for a corresponding part by
the other party. '5 2
It will be noted that the definition pertains to the divisibility of per-
formances and not to the acts whereby the contract obligations have
been created. For example, a customer with a charge account at a store
may purchase articles from time to time and so build up an obligation
to pay. This does not make out a divisible contract although the obliga-
tion was made piecemeal. Or suppose that one party has performed
and the other is to pay the price in installments: this would not be a
51. The failure of consideration on the part of A does not necessarily include
a breach by A of his duty.
52. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 266. comment e (1932).
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divisible contract. It should be noted, too, that the definition quoted
above contemplates a bilateral contract. It cannot have meaning unless
there are two obligations-each party being bound to make a series of
exchanges. The English case of Withers v. Reynolds53 affords a simple
illustration of a divisible contract. In that case it appeared that a
farmer bargained to deliver a load of straw to a stable keeper every two
weeks, and the stable keeper bargained to pay for each load as it was
delivered. Each party was to perform by installments, and each install-
ment was set opposite an installment to be rendered by the other party.
The mere fact that one or both parties to a contract are to render
their performances by installments does not make the contract a "di-
visible" one. It must further appear that each installment is to be in
exchange for a specified installment to be rendered by the other party.
For example, a contract whereby an owner undertakes to pay a
builder certain amounts at specified stages of construction, which pay-
ments would amount to three-fourths of the price, and then to pay
the balance when the building has been completed is not a divisible
contract.54
A divisible contract, as defined by the Restatement and illustrated
by the bargain in Withers v. Reynolds, seems to contemplate intervals
of time between performances. The Uniform Sales Act gives a defini-
tion that is not so restricted: viz. "'Divisible contract to sell or sale'
means a contract to sell or a sale in which by its terms the price for a
portion or portions of the goods less than the whole is fixed or ascer-
tainable by computation."5 5 That definition seems to mean that where
a commodity is sold or contracted to be sold at so much per unit-e.g.
wheat at $2 per bushel-it is a divisible contract even though the
delivery or the payment is to take place at one time. The facts in
National Knitting Co. v. Bouton & Germain Co.55a would make out a
divisible contract according to this information. The contract in that
case was to sell "a quantity of gloves of different kinds at fixed prices,
aggregating $322.86." The seller's delivery was short "one item of 18
dozen gloves, and another item of 6 dozen gloves." The court held that
the contract was divisible. Winslow, C. J., who wrote the opinion
went on to say, "The question of entirety is a question of intention.
Severability of the subject-matter and measurement of consideration
by units may assist in determining, but do not of themselves neces-
sarily determine, the question."
The concept "divisible contract," according to either one of the above
definitions, is that of one single obligation on each side calling for a
series of matched performances. In the Withers case, for instance, each
53. 2 B. & Ad. 882, 109 Eng. Rep. 1370 (K.B. 1831).
54. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 266, illustration 4 (1932).
55. UNFORM SALES ACT § 76.
55a. 141 Wis. 63, 123 N.W. 624 (1909).
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party was under a single obligation. But the seller was to deliver
several loads of straw, and the buyer was to make several payments
matched against the deliveries. And in the National Knitting Company
case the obligation of each party was single and indivisible; but the
performances were divisible, i. e., divisible into exchanges of each pair
of gloves for the price thereof.
Courts frequently say, as did Judge Winslow, that contracts are
divisible or not, according to the intention of the parties. It must be
assumed, however, as a premise that the performances are capable of
being divided. For example, a contract to sell a mule for $100 cannot
be divisible. That is flat. But a contract to sell one hundred bushels of
oats at one dollar a bushel can be divisible if the parties so intend. And,
says Judge Winslow "courts incline" to hold such contracts severable,
i.e., divisible.
A provision in the Sales Act seems to give a buyer the option to
treat a contract as divisible even if the seller did not so intend. It is
this:
"Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods larger than he
contracted to sell, the buyer may accept the goods included in the contract
and reject the rest, or he may reject the whole ....
Where the seller delivers to the buyer the goods he contracted to sell
mixed with goods of a different description not included in the contract,
the buyer may accept the goods which are in accordance with the contract
and reject the rest."56
When the seller sends a quantity of goods in excess of the amounts
he contracted to sell, or when he sends the right amount mixed with
other goods, he offers to sell what he sends. Logically an acceptance of
that offer would have to be a taking of the entire amount. But, in the
interest of convenience, this section of the statute allows the buyer to
divide the seller's performance by taking only the goods his original
contract called for.
As noted above, the subject matter of a contract must be capable of
severance in order that a contract can be divisible. After it appears
that the subject matter can be divided, it becomes a question whether
the parties intended that their contract should be divisible. One ob-
jective test sometimes used in determining the intention of the parties
is this: Does each segment of performance have full value in use? Or
must the segments be combined in order to have full value in use?
For example, a contract to buy an oil tractor engine and gang plows,
each suited to the other, was deemed an entire contract even though
the purchase price was apportioned and separate notes were given for
the respective articles.
5 7
Divisible Contract: So What? Now we come to the question of de-
56. UNiFoRm SALEs ACT § 44(2) and (3).
57. Hart-Parr Co. v. Duncan, 75 Okla. 59, 181 Pac. 288, 4 A.L.R. 1434 (1919).
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pendency in divisible contracts. First what about dependency within
each division? And, second, what about dependency with regard to the
whole contract, i.e., with regard to the sum total of all the divisions?
The problem with regard to dependency within each division is rela-
tively simple. The rules applicable are the same as they would be if the
two performances within the division were the whole contract.5
Accordingly, if the two performances within the division were to be
rendered at the same time, they are concurrently conditional. 59 And,
if one of the performances was to precede the other, the earlier per-
formance is a condition precedent.60 Another incident is this: Under
a divisible contract to sell the seller has the privilege to deliver an
installment, even though it is only a fraction of the whole amount, and
the buyer then becomes indebted for the price.61 This, however, would
be true under a contract that called for performance by installments,
even though it was not a divisible contract.62 But the exact amount to
be paid for the installment would not be fixed by the contract unless
it was a divisible contract.
When a court has to deal with a divisible contract as a whole, it
could proceed on either one of two theories. First, it could treat each
division as a separate contract. Second, it could recognize an inter-
divisional dependency. The alternative approach that is chosen affects
the result in a good many cases. Looking at each division as a separate
contract the rule to be applied would be this: The failure or prospec-
tive failure of consideration under one contract does not affect the
rights and duties of the parties under another contract.63 But Ameri-
can courts are inclined to use the other approach and to deem that
there is an inter-divisional dependency. That is, if one party fails
badly to do his duty in one division, it may preclude him from re-
covering against the other party for omitting to perform what he was
to do in another division. When a party to a divisible contract has
broken his duty with regard to one or more installments, it may
amount to a material failure on his part with regard to the whole
contract. The injured party may be thus excused from performing
any more installments.
64
The distinction between a "divisible" and an "entire" contract is
58. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 272 (1932).
59. Id. § 272, illustration 1.
60. Id. § 272, illustration 2.
61. Evans v. Barbourville Brick Co., 205 Ky. 561, 266 S.W. 46 (1924).
62. Thompson and Petty v. Conover, 32 N.J.L. 466 (Ct. Err. & App. 1865).
63. "The doctrine is well established that the breach of one contract does
not justify the aggrieved party in refusing to perform another separate and
distinct contract." Note, 27 A.L.R. 1157 (1923).
64. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Oliver, 125 Tenn. 135, 140 S.W. 595
(1911) ; Heller v. Continental Mills, 233 N.Y. 641, 135 N.E. 951 (1922),- Harton v.
Hildebrand, 230 Pa. 335, 79 Atl. 571, 574 (1911) ("The contract was entire as
to the erection of the 19 houses, and divisible and severable as to the pay-
ment of the installments for the work and material furnished.").
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difficult to make. Is it worth while? Where suit is brought to recover
the price of an installment that has been performed, it is helpful to
find that the contract was divisible. In such a contract the parties
have by agreement fixed the price of each installment. But, in a suit
where the crucial question is whether an obligee has substantially
performed what he was to do it does not seem to make any difference
whether or not the contract was divisible. In a divisible, just as in an
entire contract, the usual tests65 are applied.66
Sales of Land. A bilaterial contract for the sale of land is nearly
always a contract for an agreed exchange. The buyer is obligated to
pay the price, and the seller is obligated to convey the land. The usual
rules with regard to the dependency of the obligations apply when the
subject matter of the contract is land, just as in other cases. The appli-
cation of these rules to land contracts, however, present special prob-
lems.
The simplest form of a land sale contract is this: the buyer promises
to pay, and the seller promises to convey at a stated time in the future.
In such a case the parties probably intend that their performances are
concurrent conditions. But, even if the parties did not so intend, courts
would construe that the performances are concurrent conditions.
Neither party could recover from the other without making a tender
of his own performance.
67
But suppose that a considerable part of the purchase price is paid
when a contract to purchase land is made. And suppose that the
balance of the purchase price is to be paid and the conveyance made at
a stated time in the future. Must the seller, in such a case, tender a
conveyance of the land in order to recover the deferred payment? It
will be observed that, while each party has an obligation to perform
and the same time has been set for both performances, yet, it is not
a bargain for clean cut exchange of all the consideration on one side
for all of the consideration on the other side. The buyer owes only a
part of the price. When settlement day comes, the buyer is to render
only a fraction of his total performance. Some early cases deemed that,
in this situation, the performances were not concurrent conditions.68
But later decisions are to the effect that the seller must, in such a case,
tender a conveyance in order to recover the final payment.69 The later
65. Recited in RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS g 275 (1932).
66. "It would seem that a great deal of the confusion of the cases might be
avoided if each case were regarded rather from the importance of the non-
performance, than from the viewpoint of whether or not the particular con-
tract involved shall be regarded as 'entire' or 'severable.'" Comment, Entire
and Divisible Contracts, 37 YALE L. J. 634, 642 (1928). See also Note, 8
CORNELL L.Q. 158 (1923).
67. Maury v. Unruh, 220 Ala. 455, 126 So. 113 (1930); Phillips v. Sturm, 91
Conn. 331, 99 Atl. 689 (1917).
68. Pordage v. Cole, 1 Wms. Saund. 319, 85 Eng. Rep. 449 (K.B. 1669).
69. Kane v. Hood, 13 Pick. 281 (Mass. 1832); Robinson v. Harbour, 42 Miss.
795 (1869). See also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 268 (1932).
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rule seems equitable. While the buyer trusted the seller by making
the first payment, there is no justice in requiring him to extend further
credit, by making the final payment, without getting the land.
Contracts for the sale and purchase of land frequently provide that
the buyer shall pay the price in installments and that the seller shall
convey at the time of the last payment. Such a contract does not put
the seller under a duty to convey before the due date of the last in-
stallment. He can, therefore, recover unpaid installments without
tendering a conveyance, so long as his own performance is not due.
70
But suppose he delays suing for unpaid installments until his own per-
formance is due. Now can he bring an action against the buyer without
first tendering a conveyance? That depends on what he seeks to re-
cover.
At this juncture it is necessary to note a distinction between (a) an
action by a aggrieved party to recover the price of a performance that
the plaintiff has rendered or will render, and (b) an action to recover
the amount of damage the plaintiff suffers because the exchange con-
tracted for has not and will not be made. It is not consistent with an
action for the price for the plaintiff to withhold a performance that is
due from him to the defendant. But an action for damages suffered
because the defendant prevented the exchange from being made con-
templates that the plaintiff will omit the performance he was to have
rendered in fulfilling the contract. Thus, the question of whether a
plaintiff must tender a performance that is due from him depends on
whether he is suing for the price of his performance or is suing to
recover for the damage he suffers owing to the exchange not going
through.
Land Contracts: Payments By Installments. Let us assume that S has
contracted to sell a piece of land to B for $2,000.00 on these terms: B is
to pay $500.00 at the end of each quarter during the year 1953, the last
payment thus falling due December 31. S is to convey the land to B
on December 31, 1953. Let us assume also that the value of the land
is $1,800.00
Suppose that, in August 1953, B has made no payments, and that his
omission amounts to a breach and a material failure of consideration.
What can S do about it? One thing he can do is to sue for the sum
total of the unpaid installments.7 1 Another thing he can do is to treat
the exchange as off and sue to recover the damage he suffers because it
does not go through. If he chooses the latter alternative he should,
70. Benjamin v. Savage, 154 Minn. 159, 191 N.W. 408 (1923); Beecher v.
Conradt, 13 N.Y. 108 (1855); Turner & Happersett v. Hall & 'Connor, 128 Va.
247, 104 S.E. 861 (1920); Stevens v. Irwin, 132 Wash. 289, 231 Pac. 783
(1925).
71. The plaintiff could have sued for each installment when it fell due.
But he has only one cause of action for all of the installments that were due
when he brought suit. Beecher v. Conradt, 13 N.Y. 108 (1855).
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according to our assumption that the land is worth $1,800.00, get judg-
ment for $200.00 Must S tender a conveyance? Since no conveyance is
due from S (August 1953), it would seem that he can proceed on either
alternative basis for his suit without tendering a conveyance. If, how-
ever, he chooses to sue for installments of the price, he continues bound
to convey, come December 31.
Now suppose that January 1954 arrives and that B still has made no
payments. What can S do? The same choice is open to him now as was
open to him in August. That is, he can either sue to recover the unpaid
installments, or he can call off the exchange and sue for the damage he
suffered owing to its not going through. The situation has changed
since August, in that the time has come and passed when S was to con-
vey. Does that change the duties and conditions that rested on S? He
now has an excuse for not having conveyed on December 31. He is not
liable for his omission. And, being thus excused from his duty to con-
vey, he is also excused from making or tendering a conveyance as a
condition precedent to his right of action against B, if he sues to get
the damages he suffered from loss of the exchange. If, however, S sues
to recover the unpaid installments, that is consistent only with the idea
that the exchange is going through. He has no right to those install-
ments except in exchange for the land. Suit for the installments means
that S is not availing himself of the excuse he could have used to shield
himself from liability for his omission. In view of the choice S makes
in suing for the installments, he stands bound to convey, and B stands
bound to pay. Their performances are both due and are concurrent
conditions. S must tender in order to recover.72 S had an unqualified
right to recover one or all of the earlier installments when they fell
due. But he cannot make out a right to have the last installment except
by tendering a conveyance. Suppose that, after all installments are
due, S, without tendering a conveyance, sues for the earlier ones and
remits the last one. Some cases have held that he should thus be
allowed to get judgment for the earlier installments.73 But the weight
of authority is to the contrary. 4 And on general principles he should
not be allowed to recover the earlier installments without tendering
a conveyance. It is pertinent to observe that S has only one cause of
action for the unpaid installments. The judgment he gets, even if it
is for less than all of the installments, is all the purchase price he will
ever get. And it is not equitable that he should get the purchase money
without giving up the land. He should not be able to eat his cake and
keep it.
Contract to Sell: Chattel to be Sold Deteriorates. Consider first a
72. Beecher v. Conradt, 13 N.Y. 108 (1855).
73. Gray v. Meek, 199 Ill. 136, 64 N.E. 1020 (1902). For a collection of cases
pro and con, see Note, 35 A.L.R. 108, 119 (1925).
74. 3 WIlLISToN, CONTRACTS § 887 (rev. ed 1936).
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contract to sell a specific chattel. Suppose that, while the vendor still
owns the chattel, it receives an injury so great that the character of
the chattel is substantially changed. Would there be substantial per-
formance on the part of the seller if he tenders the injured chattel?
The law on this point is settled as stated in the Sales Act75 viz., the
buyer may at his option treat the contract as avoided. In other words,
the seller does not substantially perform by tendering the injured
chattel. The risk that the chattel would be injured or that it would
substantially deteriorate remained with seller, assuming that neither
party was to blame for the loss. The buyer can, however, elect to re-
ceive the injured chattel, being liable, if he does so, for the full pur-
chase price.
Sale with Security Title Reserved. A security device extensively
used is the conditional sale, under which the seller retains the title
to the chattel. But the buyer gets the beneficial ownership and a right
to have title on condition that he shall pay the purchase price. Under
this arrangement the buyer has the hope of gain and risk of loss.76 He
must pay the purchase price even if the chattel he bought shall perish.
There is no failure of consideration on the seller's part even if the
chattel perishes and the buyer never gets title to it. The seller sub-
stantially performed when he transferred the beneficial ownership."
A comparable situation exists when a seller and shipper of goods with-
holds from the buyer, by means of the bill of lading, a security title.
In First National Bank of Seattle v. Gidden,7 8 for instance, these were
the facts: Gorman & Co. of Seattle contracted to sell 5,000 cases of
salmon to the defendant. The salmon was shipped on a bill of lading
that made it deliverable to the order of the plaintiff bank. A bill of
exchange for the price of the salmon was drawn on the defendant
buyer, which it was his duty, under the original contract, to pay or
accept. The plaintiff's agent later received a warehouse receipt for the
bill of lading. And the defendant accepted the bill of exchange in
lieu of his earlier duty to pay or accept it. When the defendant buyer
tendered payment of the bill of exchange, the plaintiff's agent could
not at the moment find the warehouse receipt. It was later found and
was tendered to the defendant on the following day. Suit was brought
against the defendant on the bill of exchange. Was there a failure of
consideration when the plaintiff's agent omitted to make timely de-
livery of the warehouse receipt? Title was thus withheld from the
buyer. But the court noted that the warehouse receipt was held only
as collateral security, and held that the delay in its delivery did not
constitute a failure of consideration.
75. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 8(2).
76. Id. § 22 (a).
77. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 281, comment c (1932).
78. 175 App. Div. 563, 162 N.Y. Supp. 317 (1st Dep't. 1916).
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Contracts to Sell: Real Property Suffers Injury Pending Conveyance.
Consider next a contract to sell real property. And suppose that, pend-
ing conveyance, a substantial part of the property is destroyed-e.g.,
a valuable building on the land is burned. Can the vendor substantially
perform by tendering what is left of the property? The question has
come up time and again. A majority of the American jurisdictions
hold that the vendor can substantially perform by conveying what is
left of the property. The buyer is bound to pay the full purchase
price.7 9 The majority rule calls for some explanation.
It is generally taken for granted that the owner of property must
bear the risk that it may perish or be injured. But when a contract
has been made to sell real property, the buyer gets, at once, many of
the attributes of ownership. He gets more than a right in personam
against the vendor. Among the attributes of the vendee's status under
a contract to purchase are these: He can require specific performance
by the vendor. In case the vendee dies his rights under the contract
are distributed as real property, rather than as personal property. And,
if the vendee records his contract, he can hold his rights in the property
even against a later purchaser who gets a conveyance. These attributes
go far to make out ownership in the vendee.
One who contracts to buy real property automatically gets rights in
the property that are comparable to the rights of a conditional vendee
of a chattel. In one case, as in the other, the buyer lacks only the formal
title. And that usually is held back only to secure the seller that he
will get paid. And so the seller, in either case, substantially performed
when the original contract was made, even though title was not at that
time passed to the buyer.80
Leases: Are Covenants Dependent? Is a lease a contract for an
agreed exchange? The owner agrees to let the premises for a period
and, perhaps, makes other promises relative to the property. The
tenant agrees to pay rent at intervals. Are the rights of the landlord
and tenant respectively dependent or independent? For reasons that
are partly historical and partly thoretical a lease is not at common law
deemed to be a contract for an agreed exchange. And, accordingly, the
rights of the respective parties are independent. That doctrine, taken
literally, means that a tenant can be held for the rent even if the
premises are greatly damaged or destroyed. It means, too, that a land-
lord must perform his covenants even if the tenant does not pay his
rent.8 l
The historical explanation of the doctrine is this: The law with re-
gard to leases developed as a part of the law of real property and
79. See Note, 22 A.L.R. 575 (1923).
80. REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 281, comment c (1932).
81. Id. § 290.
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became settled before the doctrine of mutual dependence in bilaterial
contracts became established.
The theoretical reason why covenants in a lease are independent is
this: A lease is not a contract for an agreed exchange. The landlord
grants an estate and thus renders the greater part of his performance
at the outset.
82
The doctrine that the covenants in a lease are independent has
seemed harsh, particularly when it operated to hold a tenant bound to
pay rent after the premises had been injured or destroyed. There has,
accordingly, been some modification of the doctrine. An eviction of
the tenant operates to excuse the tenant from his promise to pay rent.
83
And if the premises become uninhabitable, even without the landlord's
fault, modern courts are inclined to deem that there has been a con-
structive eviction. In such a case the tenant can abandon the premises
and avoid a further payment of rent.84 Such decisions might as well be
put on the ground that the covenants are dependent and that there has
been a failure of consideration on the part of the landlord. Indeed
Cardozo, J., expressly rests his decision on that ground. Says he, "It
[the eviction] suspends the obligation of payment ... because it in-
volves a failure of consideration for which rent is paid. 85
The legislatures of some states have given relief to tenants in cases
where the premises are injured or destroyed. 86
Prospective Failure of Consideration. A plaintiff who has not sub-
stantially performed according to his own undertaking cannot recover
on the defendant's counter promise. What if there has been no failure
to perform, but it seems likely that the plaintiff will fail to render his
performance when it later becomes due? For example, suppose that S
has contracted to transfer his horse Pompey to B on March 1, and that
B has promised to pay the price of $200.00 in advance-viz, on February
1. Suppose further that before February 1 arrives Pompey has died.
On that day B's performance is due according to the letter of the con-
tract. And there has been no failure on the part of S. His performance
was not due. But it is clear that S will not perform when the time
comes for his performance. This prospective failure on the part of S
operates as would an actual failure-i.e., it affords a shield to B. He
need not perform in the face of the prospect that he will not get what
he was to have according to the bargain. Other sorts of events may
occur to dim the prospect that a counter performance, set by the con-
tract for a later date, will actually be rendered.
82. 3 WLUSTON, CONTRACTS § 890 (rev. ed. 1936).
83. Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917);
Ellison v. Charbonneau, 101 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1936).
84. Ingram v. Fred, 210 S.W. 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
85. Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579, 580 (1917).
86. Typical statutes are Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.11 (Baldwin Supp.
1953); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7619, 7620 (Williams 1934).
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Suppose that A and B are parties to a contract for an agreed ex-
change and that A states in advance of the time for his performance
that he doubts whether he can perform, or that he will perform even
if he can. Such a statement makes out a prospective failure of con-
sideration. B can, with impunity, withhold his performance while that
prospect continues.8 7 And if B changes his position while that prospect
continues, he is permanently discharged from a duty to perform his
promise. A can, however, nullify the effect of his statement if he re-
tracts it before B has materially changed his position.88
Another manner in which a prospective failure may come about is
this: S, having contracted to sell specific land or goods to B, sells them
to a third person.89 In such a case, if S regains title to the land or goods
before B has changed his position, B's excuse is taken away.90
The insolvency of one party may in some cases amount to prospec-
tive failure and excuse the other party from going forward. This type
of prospective failure has wide application in connection with sales of
chattels. In Ex parte Chalmers. In re Edwards9' these were the facts:
The defendant had contracted to deliver thirty tons of bleaching
powder per month from February to December, 1871. Payment was to
be made fourteen days from the date of each delivery. The buyer,
Edwards, became insolvent, and the defendant refused to deliver any
more bleaching powder under the contract. Suit was brought in behalf
of the insolvent buyer, but there was no recovery. The defendants
"committed no breach of the contract," said Sir G. Mellish, L. J., in
his opinion. He goes on to say, "What are the rights of a seller of goods
when the purchaser becomes insolvent before the contract for sale
has been completely performed? I am of opinion that the result of the
authorities is this-that in such a case the seller, notwithstanding he
may have agreed to allow credit for the goods, is not bound to deliver
any more goods under the contract until the price of the goods not yet
delivered is tendered to him." The insolvent party can, however, re-
instate his right of action if, within a reasonable time, he gives security
that his performance will be rendered.92
Frustration By Unexpected Turn of Events. The fact that a per-
formance bargained for brings no profit or advantage to the contractor
who was to receive it usually affords no defense to the disappointed
party. In some cases, however, where the disappointment was owing
to unexpected conditions which neither party brought about, the dis-
87. Benedict v. Harris, 158 Ore. 613, 77 P.2d 442 (1938).
88. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 280(2) (1932).
89. Brimmer v. Salisbury, 167 Cal. 522, 140 Pac. 30 (1914); James v.
Burchell, 82 N.Y. 108 (1880).
90. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 283, 284 (1932).
91. L.R. 8 Ch. 289 (1873). See also Diem v. Koblitz, 49 Ohio St. 41, 29 N.E.
1124 (1892).
92. Ex parte Chalmers. In re Edwards, L.R. 8 Ch. 289, 291 (1873). See also
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 287 (1932).
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appointed parties have been absolved from liability. Krell v. Henry
93
will serve as an illustrative case. That grew out of a bilaterial contract.
The plaintiff promised to let to the defendant a window overlooking
the Pall Mall in London on a day that had been set for the coronation
procession of King Edward VII. The defendant promised to take the
window on that day. He made a deposit when the contract was made
and undertook to pay the balance at a later time. When the day came
for the procession, the King was ill and the procession had to be post-
poned. In that situation each party could perform exactly what he had
undertaken to do. The plaintiff could furnish the window, and the
defendant could pay the price. But the plaintiff's performance-viz.
furnishing the window-would do the defendant no good. There was
no procession for him to enjoy. Must the defendant pay the price? Can
he set up failure of consideration as a defense? There was no literal
failure of consideration. That is, the plaintiff presumably was willing
to have the defendant occupy the window. But the defendant could
get no profit or satisfaction in using the window. He was frustrated.
This disappointment of the defendant was not anticipated by the con-
tractors and was not owing to the fault of either one. Suit was brought
for the unpaid part of the hire defendant had undertaken to pay. The
court held that the defendant should be excused.
Disappointed Lessees. A good many cases have arisen where proper-
ty leased for a certain purpose could not profitably be used for the
intended purpose, owing to an unexpected turn of events. Must the
lessee in such a case go on paying rent? The case of Wood v. Bartolino
94
will serve to illustrate. In that case the property had been leased "for
use solely as a filling station." Then came an order of the Federal
Government "freezing" automobiles, tires and tubes. It also rationed
the sale of gasoline. The lessee could not continue in business except at
heavy loss. The defendant resisted a claim for rent on the grounds of
"commercial frustration." The defendant was required to continue
paying rent. That decision probably represents the weight of authority
in cases where the lessee's business is made unprofitable but not alto-
gether unlawful by the government order.95 But where the continued
use of the premises for the purpose intended would be unlawful, the
tendency is to excuse the tenant.96
Frustration: Other Illustrations. In La Cumbre Golf and Country
93. [1903] 2 K.B. 740.
94. 48 N.M. 175, 146 P.2d 883 (1944).
95. Megan v. Updike Grain Corp., 94 F.2d 551 (8th Cir. 1938); Brown v.
Oshiro, 68 Cal. App. 2d 393, 156 P.2d 976 (1945); Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal.2d
48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944).
96. 20th Century Lites, Inc. v. Goodman, 64 Cal. App.2d 938, 149 P.2d 88
(1944); McCullough Realty Co. v. Laemmle Film Service, 181 Iowa 594, 165
N.W. 33 (1917); Hizington v. Eldred Refining Co. of New York, 235 App. Div.
486, 257 N.Y. Supp. 464 (4th Dep't 1932) ; O'Neill v. Derderian, 138 Misc. 488, 246
N.Y. Supp. 341 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1930). See Pedrick and Springfield, War
Measures and Contract Liability, 20 TExAs L. Rnv. 710 (1942).
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Club v. Santa Barbara Hotel Co.9 7 the facts were these: the defendant,
owner of the Ambassador Hotel in Santa Barbara, contracted to pay
to the Golf Club $300 per month during a given season. The Golf Club
in return contracted to give all guests of the hotel full privileges to
use the facilities of the Club. Early in the season the hotel burned.
After that there could be no guests of the hotel to use the facilities of
the Golf Club. The defendant hotel company was excused from making
payments provided for in the contract.
In Alfred Marks Realty Co. v. Hotel Hermitage Co.98 it appeared that
the defendant had contracted to pay for an advertisement in a program
and souvenir of yacht races that were to be held. The book was printed
and a limited number of copies were issued. But the yacht races were
declared off on account of war. The defendant was not required to pay.
Aleatory Contracts. Almost all bilateral contracts are for an agreed
exchange.9 9 And it has come to be the law, with regard to such con-
tracts, that a party who is substantially in default, or seems likely not
to perform, cannot hold the other party.100 A notable exception exists
with regard to aleatory contracts.
A promise is "aleatory" if it is conditional on the happening of a
fortuitous event, or on an event that is supposed by the parties to be
fortuitous. 10 ' And a bilateral contract is aleatory if one or both of the
promises are aleatory. 0 2 Insurance contracts are familiar illustrations
of aleatory contracts. In such a contract the insured pays, or promises
to pay, a relatively small amount (the premium), and the company
promises to pay a large amount if the insured shall suffer a loss-e.g.,
if his house shall burn. Insurance contracts are often unilateral. That
is, the insured often pays the premium in advance. When an insurance
contract is unilateral, substantial performance by the insured cannot
be a constructive condition precedent to his right of action. He has
already performed. Even if an insurance (or other aleatory) contract
is bilateral, the promises are not for an agreed exchange, and hence
the promises are not dependent. 103 Why are they, unlike the promises
in other bilateral contracts, not for an agreed exchange? It is because
one of the promises, by the very terms of the contract, may never have
to be performed, depending on a fortuitous event. It is obvious that
a promise by an insured to pay a $50.00 premium and a promise by the
company to pay $5,000.00 if a certain house shall burn are not promises
to exchange $50.00 for $5,000.00. The company takes a risk, calculated
at 100 to 1, that it will not have to perform at all. A contract can hardly
97. 205 Cal. 422, 271 Pac. 476 (1928).
98. 170 App. Div. 484, 156 N.Y. Supp. 179 (2d Dep't. 1915). But see Retail
Merchants' Business Expansion Co. v. Randall, 103 Vt. 266, 163 Atl. 357 (1931).
99. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 266 (1932).
100. Id. §§ 274, 280-88.
101. Id. § 291.
102. Id. § 292.
103. Id. §§ 292, 293 (1).
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be a contract to exchange performances when, by its terms, the chances
are that, on one side, there will be no performance.
In cases that involve ordinary bilateral contracts a plaintiff who is
in material default cannot recover. This is not because of a vindictive
instinct on the part of judges. It is not merely a means to punish the
plaintiff. It is because the defendant's promise was to make an ex-
change. Absent the exchange idea, a plaintiff's default does not excuse
the defendant. And so a defendant is not excused by the plaintiff's
default in case suit is brought on an aleatory contract. For instance,
an insured who has failed to pay a premium note when it was due can
still recover against the company on a policy that did not expressly
condition the company's liability on such payment being made.104
While a party to an aleatory contract cannot set up, as a defense,
the other party's failure to perform, he has remedies. As in other kinds
of contracts, a promise of an aleatory contract can sue for damages
when the promisor breaks his contract. Another thing the injured
party can do is this: If the other party has materially broken his con-
tract, or seems likely to, and if the fortuitous event insured against
does not seem more probable than it did when the contract was made,
the injured party can, by giving notice, rescind the contract.105 Such
decision would end the rights of both parties under the contract.
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT-HOW DISPENSED WITH:
Obligor's Excuse: A Concept. So long as a condition precedent has
not come to pass and has not been excused, the obligor can omit
performance of his promise with impunity.1°6 The situation can be
described in either one of two ways. It can be said that the
obligee's right of action is conditional on the existence or occur-
rence of the condition. Or the situation can be broken down
into this: The obligee has a right. The obligor has an excuse
that shields him from liability. This latter manner of speaking
treats the excuse as a concept. Just as the obligee's right is a concept,
a weapon of offense, so the obligor's excuse is a concept, a weapon of
defense. It operates to stay the hand of the obligee. The net result is
the same under either manner of speaking-viz., there can be no
recovery on the right until the condition has come to pass or the
obligor's excuse has, in some other way, been removed. Suppose, for
example, that A has contracted to build a fence for B, and that B has
contracted to pay A $20.00 on the express condition that A shall build
the fence and paint it green before June 1. So long as A has not satis-
104. Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 208 Ala. 559, 94 So. 748 (1922); Trade
Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N.J.L. 543 (Ct. Err. & App. 1883); Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. French, 30 Ohio St. 240 (1876); Langbehn v. American Ins. Co. of Newark,
N.J., 41 S.D. 581, 171 N.W. 820 (1919).
105. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 293(2) (1932).
106. Id. § 250 (a).
1955 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
fled the factual condition-i.e., built and painted the fence green before
June 1-B has an excuse. He need not pay. B's immunity in this
situation is a legal advantage. It is something he has, and, for the sake
of convenience, it is treated as a concept in the following sections. A
has a right. B has an excuse.
Obligor's Excuse: "Waiver" By Obligor. An obligor may be willing
to give up his excuse. Can he do it? Being technical for a moment, it
should be remembered that the question is not whether the obligor can
give up a condition. A condition is a fact. It is not a fit subject of gift.
A fact or occurrence cannot be given. Now, assuming that A has not
completed his task, can B give up his excuse?
The question might come up with regard to an excuse that has fully
accrued. For example, in the fence illustration used above if June 1
has come and gone without A having completed his task, B's excuse
would have fully accrued. No condition precedent could occur that
would take it away. Can B gratuitously surrender it?
The question would be different if it came up with regard to an
excuse that has not accrued. Suppose the time has not come when A
must complete his performance in order to hold B. At this juncture,
B's excuse has not accrued as a permanent thing. A's performance
still may occur and put an end to B's excuse. Maybe A will perform;
maybe not. B does not yet have A's non-performance as a final excuse.
B cannot give away an excuse that he does not have. He can only
promise that he will give up the excuse if he later gets it. Is such a
promise valid without consideration?
There is a basic difference between a gift of something the giver has
and a promise to give something that he may get later. It is necessary
therefore, to consider separately these two questions: (a) Can an obli-
gor gratuitously surrender an excuse that has finally accrued in his
favor? (b) Can an obligor gratuitously, or otherwise, bind himself to
renounce an excuse that may accrue to him later?
Excuse Accrued: Gratuitous Surrender. The concept, excuse, is com-
parable with the concept, right.10 7 The one and the other is a legal
advantage to the person in whom it is vested. An excuse, like a right,
is a fit subject for a gift. And an excuse that accrues from an unper-
formed condition can be given up without consideration unless the
condition was a substantial part of an agreed exchange.10 8 Suppose
that B has promised to pay A on condition that A shall build a fence
and paint it green before June 1. Suppose further that A fully per-
formed the conditions except that he painted the fence yellow. It
would seem that a gratuitous surrender by B of his excuse would be
effective and leave B liable. But suppose that A had omitted to build
107. See Ferson, Excuse as a Legal Concept in The Law of Contracts, 7
U. OF CiN. L. REV. 362, 370 (1933).
108. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 88, 309 (1932).
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the fence at all and that B, after June 1, purported to surrender that
excuse. The net result of such a surrender would, if valid, leave B
bound to pay for a performance that he never got-even substantially.
It would thus be an attempt to create an absolute duty on the part of B
instead of the duty originally assumed by him, which was to make an
exchange.
Implied Surrender of Excuse. The surrender of an accrued excuse by
an obligor is rarely formal, or even express. But it can be implied in
fact from what an obligor does. In Fox v. Grange,0 9 for instance, the
parties had made a bilateral contract for the sale of land. The purchase
price was to be paid by installments in advance, and the contract pro-
vided emphatically that "time of payment should be of the essence of
the contract." The purchaser was repeatedly late in making her pay-
ments, and the vendor accepted the late payments. It will be observed
that the vendor had an accrued excuse as soon as the purchaser was
late in making even one payment. The vendor's repeated acceptances
of late payments was consistent only with the idea that he remained
bound to his obligation. And so the court held. The motive of the
vendor was probably to get further payments under the contract. His
taking the late payments could be called an "election." That is, he had
an election to call off the whole contract or to go on with it. But
calling his conduct an "election" does not alter the plain fact that he
surrendered his excuse for no consideration.
In Ratcliffe v. Union Oil Co. of California"0 it appeared that the
plaintiff, a dealer, and the defendant, an oil company, had made a bi-
lateral contract whereby the plaintiff was to distribute products of the
defendant. The defendant company failed to live up to its undertaking.
The court assumed that the default of the oil company may have been
so great that it would excuse the dealer from continuing to be bound
by his undertaking. But after the company's default deliveries of oil
were made by the company and accepted by the plaintiff. This ac-
ceptance of further deliveries recreated the dealer's duties under the
contract."'
Gratuitous Surrender of Excuse: Broad Doctrine. The proposition
that an accrued excuse can be surrendered gratuitously, if it does not
forgive a performance that is a substantial part of an agreed exchange,
is part and parcel of a broad doctrine. The excuse that accrues to an
obligor when a condition precedent has not, and will not be, performed
has much in common with excuses that derive from a variety of other
109. 261 Ill. 116, 103 N.E. 576 (1913). See also Carlson & Sullivan, Inc. v.
Bigelow & Dowse Co., 202 F.2d 654 (1st Cir. 1953).
110. 159 Ore. 221, 77 P.2d 136 (1938). See also, Pasquel v. Owen, 186 F.2d 263
(8th Cir. 1950); In re Malko Milling & Lighting Co., 32 F.2d 825 (D. Md.
1929); Malone & Co. v. Stone & Co., 214 Ky. 443, 283 S.W. 407 (1926).




facts. There are many things that operate to vest obligors with excuses.
For example, an obligor has an excuse and so can avoid liability if he
was an infant when he made his promise, or, if he was defrauded, or,
if the statute of limitations has run in his favor, or, if he has been dis-
charged in bankruptcy. In all such cases obligors can surrender their
excuses without consideration."
2
Giving Up Excuse: Retaining Right. A gift is perhaps the most ele-
mentary kind of legal transaction. Tangible chattels can be given, and,
within limits, intangible things can be given." 3 The subject of the gift
must be identified. That is relatively simple in the giving of tangible
chattels. But when a party to a contract has a right against his co-
contractor, and also has an excuse that would let him out of perform-
ing his own promise, it may become a question as to what he gives up.
The case of Morse v. Moore" 4 will serve to illustrate. In that case it
appeared that the plaintiff had contracted to sell and the defendant had
contracted to buy "good clear merchantable ice." Looking at the con-
tract analytically, the seller was under a duty to supply "good clear
merchantable ice"-and in order to hold the buyer he had to meet a
condition-he had to supply "good clear merchantable ice." A delivery
by the seller of good ice would satisfy both the duty and the condition.
Stating the same thing from the buyer's point of view, he had a right
to get good ice; and he also had an excuse for not paying so long as
he did not get good ice. In pursuance of the contract the plaintiff
(seller) tendered and the buyer accepted the poor ice. Did he give up
his excuse? Did he give up his rights? The case assumes that the
buyer (defendant) gave up his excuse, and it is generally true that one
who accepts a defective performance waives the defect." 5 It is not con-
sistent that he should accept the performance and at the same time
deny that he is liable. But when the buyer accepted the poor ice, and
thus gave up his excuse, did he also give up his right to have delivered
to him "good clear merchantable ice?" That is a separate question.
The case holds that the buyer did not, by accepting the poor ice, give
up his right to have good ice. And, to the extent that the buyer suffered
from the defective performance, he was allowed to have recoupment
from the price he was to pay.
The case discussed above indicates that a person can give up an ex-
cuse that shields him without necessarily giving up his right against
the other party. He may, however, give up his right also if he retains
112. Ferson, Excuse as a Legal Concept In the Law of Contracts, 7 U. OF Cmn.
L. REV. 362 (1933); FERSON, THE RATIONAL BASIS OF CONTRACTS C. 10 (1949);
3 WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 693 (rev. ed. 1936); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §
88 (1932).
113. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 88, 158, 410-16 (1932).
114. 83 Me. 473, 22 Atl. 362 (1891). See also Smelt Fishermens Ass'n v.
Soleim, 39 Wash.2d 524, 236 P.2d 1057 (1951).
115. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §298 (1932).
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what he received for a long time and fails to complain.116
Excuse of Condition: Prevention or Hindrance By Obligor. When the
condition on which the liability of an obligor depends is something to
be done by the obligee, justice dictates that if the obligor prevents the
obligee from doing that thing the obligor cannot stand on the condition.
His excuse will no longer avail. In United States v. Peck, 71 for instance,
it appeared that Peck contracted to cut hay in a certain area and de-
liver it to the Government. Performance by Peck was, of course, a
condition precedent to a right of action for the purchase price. In this
situation the Government went in and cut the hay that Peck was to cut.
The Government's action prevented Peck from performing and so
excused his non-performance. The case of Artotte v. National Liberty
Ins. Co.118 will serve as further illustration. In that case it appeared
that the defendant company had insured the plaintiff's building against
injury by falling aircraft or by automobiles, trucks and motorcycles.
The policy provided that the plaintiff should give immediate notice of
loss and file proof within sixty days. The plaintiff's building was in-
jured when a truck crashed into it and started a fire. The plaintiff gave
timely notice of his loss but was under the impression that his insur-
ance policy had been burned in the fire. An agent of the company then
told the plaintiff that the policy covered loss by falling aircraft only
and did not cover damage caused by a collision of a truck with the
building. The plaintiff was thus dissuaded from filing proof within the
time it should have been filed. Thereafter plaintiff's policy turned up
and revealed that it covered losses from truck collisions as well as
from falling aircraft. After plaintiff's policy turned up, he filed proof
of loss and was allowed to recover. It was the company's misrepre-
sentation that prevented him from meeting the condition that he must
file proof within sixty days after loss.
Excuse of Condition: Repudiation of Contract By Obligor. Repudia-
tion by an obligor of his duty tends to prevent the obligee from per-
forming conditions that were incumbent on him. Such a repudiation
amounts to an admonition to the obligee like this: "Whatever you do
by way of performing a condition will be in vain. I shall not perform
anyway." The obligee is justified in taking the obligor at his word
and refraining from the doing of a useless thing. The following illus-
tration is taken from the Restatement of Contracts: "A, an insurance
company provides in a policy that is issued to B, that in case of loss no
payment will be made unless notice is given within 60 days after loss,
116. Id. § 412; UNIFORM SALES ACT § 49.
117. 102 U.S. 64 (1880).
118. 312 Pa. 442, 167 Atl. 295 (1933). See also Dabovich & Co. v. Emeric, 12
Cal. 171 (1859); O'Toole & Nedeau Co. v. Boelkins, 254 Mich. 44, 235 N.W.
820 (1931); Dilworth v. Brown & Bigelow, 128 Pa. Super. 124, 193 Atl. 125
(1937); Fedas v. Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania, 300 Pa. 555, 151 Atl.
285 (1930).
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nor except after arbitration as provided in the policy. A loss occurs.
The insurance company promptly learns of it, and for no adequate
reason informs B that payment will not be made. The conditions of
notice and arbitration are excused." 119 The case of Cort & Gee v. Am-
bergate Ry. Co. 120 will serve as further illustration. In that case it ap-
peared that the defendant company had undertaken to receive and pay
for railway chairs to be manufactured by the plaintiffs. The defendant
notified the plaintiffs that it would not accept the chairs. The plaintiffs
accordingly did not make or tender the chairs. Owing to the repudia-
tion, the plaintiffs were able to recover for loss of profits without hav-
ing made or tendered the chairs.
This section should be compared with the discussion on Prospective
Failure of Consideration, supra. That section views the repudiation as
a prospective failure of consideration. It has to do with the discharge
of the injured party from his duty to perform his promise. The present
section relates to his right of action against the repudiator.
It should be added that if the condition would not have been per-
formed anyway the obligor's repudiation does not excuse the obligee
for not performing it. Again, drawing an illustration from the Restate-
ment, it is this: "A contracts to sell and B to buy a specified horse on
July 1 for $500. B informs A on June 15 that B will not take the horse.
On June 20 the horse dies. The constructive condition of tender by A
is not excused since a failure to perform was not induced by B's repudi-
ation."'121
Excuse of Condition by Giving Inadequate Reason for Rejection.
Suppose that a plaintiff has not performed a condition that was prece-
dent to his right of action. And suppose further that the defendant re-
fused to perform, basing his refusal on something other than the non-
performance by the plaintiff of his condition. Does the defendant stand
excused by the failure of the condition to accur? The case of List &
Son Co. v. Chase'22 will serve to illustrate the problem and to answer
the question. The facts of the case were that the plaintiff had con-
tracted to sell and the defendant had contracted to buy 74 cases of eggs.
Shipment was to be made over a designated railroad. The plaintiff,
purporting to carry out the contract, shipped to the defendant 195
cases of eggs over a railroad other than the one that had been desig-
nated. When the eggs arrived, the defendant refused to accept them on
the ground that they "did not stand inspection." The trial court took
the position that the defendant thus waived the fact that a wrong
quantity had been shipped and over a wrong railroad. But the supreme
court reversed the lower court. Said Davis, J., "When the buyer has
119. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 306, illustration 1 (1932).
120. 17 Q.B. 127 (1851).
121. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 306, illustration 2 (1932).
122. 80 Ohio St. 42, 88 N.E. 120 (1909). See also Cawley v. Weiner, 236
N.Y. 357, 140 N.E. 724 (1923).
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absolutely rejected the goods, for whatever reason, his silence as to
other objections which would justify his refusal to accept, when unac-
companied by conduct which may have misled and prejudiced the
vendor cannot be construed as a waiver of the buyer's right to insist
on his plea of non-performance on those grounds."
While a promisor does not lose his excuse by failing to put it for-
ward, he may, in the circumstances, estop himself from using the ex-
cuse. That happens when the promisor's attitude leads the promisee
away from making a proper tender. Smith v. Pettee,123 for instance, is
a case where a seller of iron could have tendered the right amount and
quality of iron, but was persuaded not to do so because the buyer
refused to take the iron for other reasons. And when a check is
tendered, where legal tender was called for, a rejection of the tender
on other grounds may excuse the failure to tender actual money. It
will excuse the defective tender if the person who made the tender
could have tendered money and was lulled away from doing so by a
rejection that was stated to be made on other grounds.12
Excuse Not Accrued: Contract to Surrender. It is obvious that a
person cannot give or sell a thing he does not have. And a purported
sale or gift of something to be acquired later does not operate to pass
title to the thing when the seller or giver later acquires it.125 It is, of
course, possible for a person to contract that he will give up this or that
when he does get it. These general propositions are applicable to the
disposal of excuses. That is, an obligor cannot presently give up an
excuse that has not accrued. But he can contract that he will renounce
the excuse when it shall accrue.
Let us suppose that an act of a promisee is a condition precedent to
his right of action, and that he may or may not perform it. Suppose
further that the obligor, expressly or impliedly, says to this promisee,
"I will perform even though you do not meet the condition." At this
juncture the promise of the obligor is gratuitous. But going on, suppose
the promisee in reliance on the obligor's promise omits to perform the
condition. There would still be a lack of orthodox consideration, but
the facts would make out promissory estoppel. That is sufficient to
make the promise enforceable.126
In Dreier v. Sherwood,12 7 for instance, a contract for the sale of land
strongly provided that the buyer would forfeit his rights if he failed to
make a $10,000.00 payment at a specified time. In other words, it pro-
vided that payment on time was a condition precedent to the buyer's
123. 70 N.Y. 13 (1877). See also Johnson v. Oppenheim, 55 N.Y. 280, 291
(1873); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 304 (1932).
124. O'Toole & Nedeau Co. v. Boelkins, 254 Mich. 44, 235 N.W. 820 (1931);
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 305 (1932).
125. Low v. Pew, 108 Mass. 347 (1871); UNIFORM SALES ACT § 5.
126. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
127. 77 Colo. 539, 238 Pac. 38 (1925).
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right of action against the vendor. Later the vendor consented that the
buyer might delay making the payment. The buyer, in reliance on
the vendor's permission, delayed making the payment. It was held
that the vendor must perform, even though the buyer did not perform
the condition precedent that was set up in the original contract.
Implied Contract to Excuse Non-Performance of Condition. An
obligor's agreement that he will forgive the non-performance of a
condition precedent is sometimes called a "waiver." That term, of
uncertain meaning, is no help. The law of contracts, embodying as it
does the doctrine of promissory estoppel, is a sound basis for the
decisions.
The obligor's promise, plus action in reliance thereon, makes out a
contract. That contract is easily and specifically enforced when the
obligor is prevented from interposing what, without contract, would
have been a valid excuse.
Since promissory estoppel constitutes, or takes the place of, con-
sideration for the obligor's promise, it follows that if the other party
takes no action in reliance on the promise it is not binding.12 It fol-
lows, too, that the promise can be revoked if that is done before the
other party has materially changed his position in reliance on the
promise.129
The promise of an obligor that he will forgive the non-performance
of a condition need not be express. It can be implied in fact. In Fox
v. Orange,130 for instance, the repeated acceptances of late payments
by a vendor of land amounted to a promise that the purchaser might
be late in making future payments. The vendor was not allowed
suddenly to reinstate prompt payments by the purchaser as condi-
tions precedent to the vendor's liability.
I Conditions Excused to Avoid Forfeiture. In most situations an
obligee is not excused from satisfying a condition that is precedent to
his right of action merely because it is impossible for him to perform
the condition. 31 He may be excused, however, in cases where he
would suffer unjust forfeiture if he were held to a given condition.
Suppose, for instance, that A has built a house for B and that B's
obligation to pay for the house was on condition that architect X
should certify that the house was well built. Suppose further that,
after the house was built, architect X died without having given the
certificate. It would involve a heavy forfeiture on the part of A
if he Were denied a right of action. He is accordingly allowed to re-
cover even though he cannot furnish the certificate. 132
128. Colbath v. Stebbins Lumber Co., 127 Me. 406, 144 Atl. 1 (1929).
129. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 297 (1932).
130. 261 Ill. 116, 103 N.E. 576 (1913). See also General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Hicks, 189 Ark. 62, 70 S.W.2d 509 (1934).
131. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 301 (1932).
132. Id. §§ 302, 303 (a).
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Recoveries have, in some instances, been allowed on insurance
policies even though conditions precedent were not performed. When
a plaintiff is relieved in such a case from satisfying the condition, it
is by reason of equitable considerations. How far a court should depart
from the letter of a contract in the interest of justice is a matter
of opinion. It is not surprising, therefore, that some courts have
gone further than others in allowing recovery where the letter of
the contract would dictate no recovery. Two cases will be cited by
way of illustration.
In Hanna v. Commercial Travelers' Mut. Accident Ass'n of America1'
these were the facts: The insured drove away from home on a stormy
rainy morning. Nothing was heard from or about him for four years.
Then his automobile was dredged up from the bottom of the Dela-
ware River. It was the plaintiff's theory that, on that stormy morning,
when insured drove away he missed a turn that he should have made,
and drove straight into the river. The jury took this view of the
facts. The policy of the insured required that, in case of accident,
immedite notice must be given to the company, and proof of the
death or injury must be made in sixty days. These were conditions
precedent and, of course, were not performed. It was held by a
divided court that there could be no recovery on the policy. It was
said by Finch, J., that the defendant's "promise cannot be enlarged
by the court, so as to fasten a liability on the defendant, which the
latter did not undertake."'134
In Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Johnson'3 it ap-
peared that the company had issued a policy whereby they promised
to pay to one Cooksey disability benefits and to waive premium
payments on certain conditions. One condition was that "while no
premium on the policy is in default, the Insured shall furnish to the
Company due proof that he is totally and permanently disabled."
The insured became totally and permanently disabled shortly before
he was in default on a premium payment. He was, therefore, unable to
give the notice to the insurer in advance of the default. Recovery
was allowed although timely notice had not been given. Judge
Cardozo, in his opinion, notes the difference of authority on the
point and then proceeds to say: "Without suggesting af independent
preference . . . we yield to the judges of Virginia expounding a
Virginia policy and adjudging its effect."'
13 6
Equitable considerations may also spare an obligee from losing
his right of action through the operation of a condition subsequent. In
133. 204 App. Div. 258, 197 N.Y. Supp. 395 (1st Dep't 1922).
134. Id. at 397.
135. 293 U.S. 335 (1934). See also Schlintz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of
United States, 226 Wis. 255, 276 N.W. 336 (1937).
136. 293 U.S. 335, 339 (1934).
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Semmes v. Hartford Insurance Co.137 it appeared that the plaintiff,
a resident of Mississippi, had a fire insurance policy issued by the
defendant, a citizen of Connecticut. The policy provided that no
suit could be brought on it "unless such suit should be commenced
within the term of twelve months next after any loss." The plaintiff
suffered a loss in 1860. He brought suit against the company in 1866,
having been prevented by the Civil War from suing within the twelve-
month period. The provision that suit must be brought within twelve
months after suffering a loss, or not at all, was a condition subse-
quent. Failure to sue within that time would, if unexplained, take
away the plaintiff's right of action. But plaintiff's inability to sue
during the war relieved him from the normal operation of the con-
dition. His delay did not bar him from recovering.
137. 13 Wall. 158 (U.S. 1871).
